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CHEATER’S JUSTICE: JUDICIAL RECOURSE 
FOR VICTIMS OF GAMING FRAUD 
Jordan T. Smith* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Legends of extrajudicial “cheater’s justice” dealt upon gaming con-artists 
and swindlers have deep historical roots. In the Old West, a card shark may 
have been shot on sight.1 Later, when the mob (allegedly) ran Las Vegas, a 
hustler might have been given the choice of “hav[ing] the money and the 
hammer or [walking] out of here,” but not both.2 Gradually, as gambling 
became more socially acceptable and government regulation of it increased, 
disputants transitioned from wielding brutish self-help remedies to pursuing 
legal retribution.3 Today, courts largely accept that a party cheated in a 
gambling game can recover any losses in a civil action without necessarily 
being limited to administrative remedies through a state’s gaming regulators.4 
                                                            
* Mr. Smith is an attorney in Nevada. The views expressed in this Article belong 
solely to the Author and do not reflect the views of any employer or client.  
1  See People v. Grimes, 64 P. 101, 103 (Cal. 1901) (“The deceased may have 
treated the appellant unfairly and unjustly in the matter of the game of cards, but 
that treatment gave appellant no legal excuse or justification for taking his life.”); 
see also State v. Vansant, 80 Mo. 67, 73–74, 1883 WL 9952, *5 (1883); Johnson v. 
State, 10 S.W. 235, 236 (Tex. App. 1888); State v. Shadwell, 57 P. 281 (Mont. 
1899). 
2  Casino (Universal Pictures 1995); see also United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 
758, 768 (6th Cir. 2011) (“When Sam ‘Ace’ Rothstein directs guards to smash a 
cheater’s hand in Martin Scorsese’s Casino, a reasonable person could interpret 
that as a threat.”).  
3  See I. Nelson Rose, Compulsive Gambling and Gaming Debts, 20 GAMING L. 
REV. & ECON. 627, 628–30 (2016) (recognizing “[m]ajor changes” in Americans’ 
views towards gambling and discussing the gaming industry’s evolution from 
“threats” and “cruder” methods of collecting gaming debts to collecting through the 
court system).  
4  See, e.g., Berman v. Riverside Casino Corp., 323 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1963) 
(“[T]he common law rule, as of the time of Nevada’s admission to the Union, 
appears to have been that one who lost money in a crooked gambling game could 
recover in a civil action.”); Erickson v. Desert Palace, Inc., 942 F.2d 694, 697 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (“[A] party may assert an action outside the administrative process to 
recover gambling losses sustained due to casino fraud” but disputes over alleged 
winnings in a legitimate game are considered “gaming debts” under the statutory 
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Nevertheless, many facets of litigation against cheaters remain uncertain, and 
courts sometimes struggle with the appropriate theory of liability, the role of 
administrative remedies, and the proper calculation of damages. The recent 
dispute between a professional gambler, Phil Ivey, and the Borgata Hotel 
Casino & Spa illustrates these issues and, given the case’s notoriety, the court’s 
missteps are likely to influence other cases where victims of cheating attempt to 
recover their losses. 
In a trio of decisions, the Ivey court misapprehended the established 
common law rule that claims to recover losses sustained in a crooked gambling 
game sound in fraud, not contract. The court compounded its error, in part, 
through an inability to reconcile a wager’s contractual nature with the 
fraudulent character of cheating. Wagers between a patron and a casino form a 
contract, and the governing statutes, regulations, and game rules supply the 
gaming contract’s material terms. These sources always contain express or 
implied prohibitions against cheating that are, in turn, incorporated into the 
gaming contract. But, contrary to the Ivey court, cheating does not only give 
rise to a breach of contract claim for statutory violations. Rather, charlatans 
commit fraud by placing their bet—entering into the gaming contract—without 
the intent to honor their contractual promise not to cheat. And even though 
contractual breach alone cannot establish fraud, direct or circumstantial 
evidence that the patron entered the gaming contract without the intent to play 
by the rules can establish cheating. 
Regardless of the liability theory employed, the Ivey court erred by 
rejecting as too speculative the use of expectation or probabilistic damages. The 
Restatements and case law approve damage calculations based on the casino’s 
statistical advantage on any one roll of the dice or turn of the cards. While luck 
is always a factor, odds-based damages are ascertainable to a sufficient degree 
of mathematical certainty and, if there remains any doubt about the amount of 
damages, the cheater—not the casino—should bear the risk. 
II. MARINA DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC V. IVEY 
A. Ivey Tips the Odds in his Favor. 
In 2012, Ivey and a colleague, Cheng Yin Sun, arranged a high-stakes 
Baccarat game at Borgata.5 Baccarat is a game of chance where patrons bet on 
                                                            
scheme and “are confined to the administrative process followed by state judicial 
review”); see also Golden Nugget v. Gemaco, Inc., ATL–L–5000–12, 2015 WL 
689437 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 9, 2015) (holding that courts may interpret 
gaming statutes to resolve disputes related to allegations of “illegal” gaming when 
regulators decline to act) but see Kelly v. First Astri Corp., 72 Cal. App. 4th 462 
(1999) (holding that California’s strong public policy against judicial resolution of 
gaming related disputes bars enforcement of gaming debts as well as tort actions to 
recover losses from alleged cheating).  
5  Marina Dist. Dev. Co., LLC v. Ivey, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2016 WL 6138239, at *2 
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the relative value of two hands before the dealer deals from a shoe.6 The 
general goal is to bet on the hand that ends up closest to, or totaling, nine.7 The 
dealer initially deals two cards to each hand and might deal a third card to 
either or both hands, depending on each hand’s value after the deal.8 “Tens, 
face cards, and any cards that total ten are counted as zero. All other cards are 
counted at face value.”9 Unlike blackjack, neither hand can “bust.”10 
Patrons can place three types of wagers.11 A patron can bet on a “banker” 
hand, a “player” hand, or on a tie.12 The “banker” hand is not the casino (or 
“the house”) and the “player” hand does not represent any patron playing the 
game.13 A wager on “banker” is a bet that the banker hand will be closest to 
nine; a wager on “player” is a bet that the player hand will be closest to nine; 
and a wager on the tie is (intuitively) a bet that the both hands will equal the 
same amount.14 “A winning bet on ‘banker’ pays 19 to 20. A winning bet on 
‘player’ pays even money. A winning bet on ‘tie’ pays 8 to 1. The house 
advantage for Baccarat is approximately 1.06% on ‘banker’ bets, 1.24% on 
‘player’ bets, and 4.84% on ‘tie’ bets.”15 
Baccarat patrons are known for their superstitious rituals.16 In some game 
variations, casinos allow patrons to squeeze, crease, bend, or tear cards (non-
reusable), and ask the dealer to let them “peek” at the cards before the deal.17 
Because of these unique traditions, Borgata did not become suspicious when 
Ivey made five apparently idiosyncratic requests as conditions to playing 
Baccarat at Borgata.18 He requested a private pit area, a guest (Sun) to sit with 
him while he played, a dealer who spoke Mandarin Chinese, one 8-deck shoe 
of purple Gemaco-brand Borgata playing cards for each playing session, and 
the use of an automatic shuffling device between shoes.19 Borgata agreed to 
these conditions, and Ivey accepted maximum betting limits ranging from 
$50,000 to $100,000 per hand.20 Under these arrangements, Ivey visited 
Borgata four times over a few months and won $9,626,000.21 
                                                            
(D. N.J. Oct. 21, 2016) [hereinafter “Ivey II”]. 
6  Id. at *2 n.3. 
7  Id. 
8  Id.  
9  Id. 
10  See id.  
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
14  Id.  
15  Id.  
16  Id. at *9.  
17  Id.  
18  Id. at *2.  
19  Id.  
20  Id. at **2–3.  
21  Id. at *3.  
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After Ivey’s fourth visit, Borgata learned that a casino in London was 
withholding millions of Ivey’s winnings from a similar game, played with the 
same five conditions.22 Its suspicions aroused, Borgata decided that Ivey’s 
requested prerequisites were a ruse to perpetrate a form of alleged cheating 
known as an “edge sorting scam.”23 “Edge sorting” arranges the playing cards 
to reveal a discrepancy in the pattern on the back of the cards.24 The pattern, in 
turn, foretells the value of the cards before betting.25 In this particular case, 
under the guise of being superstitious, Sun asked the dealer to turn the cards in 
different directions so the pattern would show.26 Sun knew that the automatic 
shuffler would not change the direction of the cards between shoes.27 With the 
design pattern visible, Ivey was able to acquire “first card knowledge” about 
the value of the cards before each deal and was able to increase his bets when 
he saw favorable starting cards.28 Using this method, Ivey tilted the odds of the 
game from a 1.06% house advantage to a 6.756% advantage in his favor.29 
B. Borgata files suit. 
Feeling scammed, Borgata filed suit in federal district court alleging “that 
‘Ivey’s true motive, intention, and purpose in negotiating these playing 
arrangements was to create a situation in which he could surreptitiously 
manipulate what he knew to be a defect in the playing cards in order to gain an 
unfair advantage over Borgata.’”30 Borgata alleged a variety of claims, 
including breach of contract, fraud, conspiracy, and RICO violations.31 The 
thrust of Borgata’s breach of contract claim was that each wager contained a 
contractual obligation to comply with the New Jersey’s Casino Control Act 
(“CCA”) and that Ivey’s and Sun’s failure to do so breached their gaming 
contracts (wagers) with Borgata.32 Borgata’s fraud, RICO, and conspiracy 
claims were based on similar allegations. For those claims, Borgata asserted 
that Ivey and Sun “misrepresented that they intended to abide by the rules of 
honest play established and required by the CCA.”33 Borgata also alleged that 
                                                            
22  Id.  
23  Id.  
24  Id. at *3. 
25  Id. at *4. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Id.  
30  Marina Dist. Dev. Co., LLC v. Ivey, 93 F. Supp. 3d 327, 332 (D. N.J. 2015) 
[hereinafter “Ivey I”] (quoting Amend. Compl. Dkt. No. 5 ¶ 42).  
31  Id. at 332; see also Ivey II, supra note 5, at *10 n.22 (discussing Borgata’s 
alternative theories of liability). Borgata also filed suit against the manufacturer of 
the cards, Gemaco. Ivey I, supra note 30, at 332 n.3.  
32  Ivey I, supra note 30, at 336.  
33  Id. at 339.  
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Ivey and Sun misrepresented the reasons for requesting the playing 
accommodations.34 
Ivey and Sun moved to dismiss the complaint.35 They argued that Borgata 
lacked any private causes of action under the CCA.36 They also claimed that, if 
they played an “illegal game,” then Borgata’s claims were statutorily time-
barred.37 And they contended that the court should dismiss the fraud, 
conspiracy, and RICO claims because they did not commit an underlying 
fraudulent act.38 Ivey and Sun maintained that they did not defraud or cheat 
Borgata because Ivey merely used his keen eyesight to observe information on 
the back of the cards that was equally available to other patrons and the 
casino.39 
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Borgata asserted that the CCA 
precludes only patrons’ claims against casinos and does not bar casinos’ claims 
against patrons.40 Borgata also averred that, while Ivey’s conduct may have 
violated the CCA, the casino was not attempting to privately enforce the 
statutes.41 Instead, Borgata described its action as a common law breach of 
contract and fraud case, for which violations of the CCA may constitute 
evidence of breach or evidence of fraud.42 Lastly, Borgata clarified that it was 
not claiming the game was “illegal,” it was arguing that Ivey and Sun had an 
‘“illegality of purpose’ in playing an otherwise lawful game.”43 
When ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court threatened to 
administratively terminate Borgata’s breach of contract claim as covered by the 
CCA.44 The court agreed with Borgata that, since gaming is generally illegal 
except where authorized by statute, all gaming contracts contain an express or 
implied promise that both parties will comply with the CCA.45 The court 
recognized that entertaining Borgata’s contract claim would require 
determining whether Ivey’s and Sun’s actions amounted to cheating under the 
CCA and therefore whether they breached the terms of the gaming contract.46 
But in the court’s estimation, case law precluded it from conducting this 
analysis or considering any claim that required an interpretation of the CCA.47 
                                                            
34  Id.  
35  Id. at 332, 334. 
36  Id. at 334.  
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  Id.  
41  Id. 
42  Id.  
43  Id.  
44  Id. at 339. 
45  Id. at 336.  
46  Id. at 338–39.  
47   Id. at 338 (citing Campione v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 714 A.2d 299, 308 (N.J. 
1998)).  
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New Jersey Supreme Court authority held that, because of the importance of 
maintaining stability and uniformity in the casino industry, the legislature 
vested gaming regulators with primary jurisdiction over claims involving CCA 
interpretation.48 Under this precedent, the Ivey court stayed Borgata’s breach of 
contract claim until the New Jersey Casino Control Commission or Division of 
Gaming Enforcement administratively resolved it.49 
The court left open the possibility that casinos can assert other claims in a 
judicial forum—without first resorting to regulators—because the legislature 
did not design the CCA to preempt all common law causes of action.50 “The 
CCA,” the court noted, “does not create a common law cause of action that 
does not otherwise exist[,]”51 and it was because “[t]here is no statutory or 
common law cause of action for a breach of an agreement to abide by the rules 
of an illegal gambling activity[,]” that the court could not hear the contract 
claim.52 The court identified fraud as an available common law cause of action 
for casinos victimized by cheating, even if the fraud occurs within the confines 
of a regulated game.53 
But the court narrowed the permissible factual allegations that it would 
allow to support a fraud claim outside the administrative process. As with its 
ruling on the breach of contract claim, the court refused to entertain Borgata’s 
contention that Ivey and Sun defrauded Borgata by “misrepresent[ing] that they 
intended to abide by the rules of honest play established and required by the 
CCA…”54 The court also thought these allegations required CCA 
interpretations that must first go before gaming regulators.55 To avoid these 
administrative entanglements, the court construed Borgata’s fraud-based claims 
as hinging on Ivey’s and Sun’s alleged misrepresentations about their purpose 
for requesting the playing accommodations.56 So construed, the fraud-based 
claims did not depend on an application of the CCA and the court deemed those 
claims sufficiently pleaded to withstand the motion to dismiss.57 
C. The Court Enters Summary Judgment on Liability. 
Discovery did not materially alter the arguments presented at the motion to 
dismiss stage, and the case proceeded to summary judgment.58 All parties 
agreed that the central issue before the court was whether the “use of the edge 
                                                            
48  Id.  
49  Id. at 339. 
50  Id. at 337 n.5.  
51  Id. at 337–38.  
52  Id. at 337 n.6.  
53  Id. at 337 n.5.  
54  Id. at 339. 
55  Id. at 339 n.9.  
56  Id. at 339. 
57  Id. at 342–43.  
58  Ivey II, supra note 5, at *1.  
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sorting technique in Baccarat constitutes fair play, breach of contract, or 
fraud.”59 Even though the court ruled earlier that there was “no statutory or 
common law cause of action for a breach of an agreement to abide by the rules 
of an illegal gambling activity,”60 the court determined that it could address 
Borgata’s breach of contract claim because the New Jersey regulators still had 
not issued a decision.61 
After analyzing the CCA, the court ultimately concluded that edge sorting 
is a prohibited form of “using” or “possessing” “marked cards.”62 The court 
ruled as a matter of law that “Ivey and Sun’s violation of the card marking 
provision in the CCA constitutes a breach of their mutual obligation with 
Borgata to play by the rules of the CCA.”63 Accordingly, the court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Borgata on its breach of contract claim. 
Somewhat contradictorily, the court continued to focus on Ivey’s and Sun’s 
representations about their motivations for requesting the playing 
accommodations and did not also reconsider Borgata’s fraud allegations about 
their alleged lack of intent to abide by the applicable statutes and rules when 
entering play.64 The court’s evaluation of their motivations stressed the role of 
Baccarat’s game rules rather than the statutory scheme.65 Although it earlier 
found that Ivey and Sun violated the CCA, the court deduced that “none of the 
actual rules of Baccarat were broken” because the rules of Baccarat do not 
prohibit players from handling or manipulating cards.66 And because none of 
the game rules were broken, Ivey and Sun did not make any material 
misrepresentation to Borgata.67 “That Borgata chose to believe that Ivey and 
Sun were superstitio[us],” the court explained, “does not amount to detrimental 
reliance, when no explanation at all could have resulted in the same course of 
                                                            
59  Id.  
60  Ivey I, supra note 30, at 337 n.6. 
61  Ivey II, supra note 5, at *5. 
62  Id. at **6–7. The Author takes no position on whether edge sorting constitutes 
impermissible cheating, or permissible “advantage play,” nor does the Author 
express an opinion about Ivey’s or Sun’s alleged liability. See Kevin Schweitzer, 
Living on the Edge, Sorting Out the Rules: Advantage Play Cuts the Risk of Losing 
Money in A Casino, and Puts Players at Risk of Incurring Legal Action, 6 UNLV 
GAMING L.J. 324, 332–33 (2016) (describing edge sorting as falling within the 
“gray area” “between innocent play and cheating”); see also Jordan Scot Flynn 
Hollander, Superstition, Skill, or Cheating? How Casinos and Regulators Can 
Combat Edge Sorting, 24 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1, 6–7 (2017) 
(describing edge sorting as an example of the second category of advantage play 
within the framework offered by Anthony Cabot and Robert Hannum). 
63  Ivey II, supra note 5, at *7.  
64  See id. at **7–12.  
65  See id. at *9 n.17. 
66   Id. at *9. Additionally, the court did not discern a violation of any CCA 
provision that requires a finding of fraud. Id. at *7 n.14. 
67   Id. at 9. Assuming the court is right that edge sorting is a form of cheating, its 
statement that “none of the actual rules of Baccarat were broken” is incorrect. See 
infra text accompanying note 149.  
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events.”68 Similarly, the court decided that Ivey’s and Sun’s misrepresentations 
were not material because Borgata could have granted or denied their requests 
to turn the cards even without an explanation.69 
The court also relied on the maxim that a breach of contract alone does not 
amount to fraud and further held that “Ivey and Sun did not defraud Borgata in 
the legal sense…because their representations did not violate Baccarat’s 
rules….”70 The implication of the court’s reasoning is that a violation of 
Baccarat’s rules would amount to fraud—but not a breach of contract—while a 
violation of the CCA amounts to a breach of contract, but not fraud.71 To reach 
this result, the court separated the game rules from the terms of the gaming 
contract and separated the CCA from the game rules. The court reasoned that 
“Borgata and Ivey and Sun were obligated to follow the proscriptions of the 
CCA in order to lawfully gamble in the first place, and then they were also 
obligated to follow the rules of Baccarat. Ivey and Sun breached their primary 
obligation” but not the secondary obligation imposed by the game’s rules.72 In 
the Ivey court’s view, if game rules were part of the gaming contract like the 
CCA, representations in conflict with the game rules would merely breach the 
contract and would not be an independent basis for a fraud action. 
On the record before it, the court did not find a misrepresentation, distinct 
from the breach of contract, that violated Baccarat’s rules.73 According to the 
court, “Borgata’s argument devolve[d] into a contention that defendants acted 
fraudulently because they did not reveal their fraudulent intent. Fraud is not so 
easy to prove.”74 The court compared Ivey’s and Sun’s representations to a 
play-action pass in football or the “Marshall swindle” in chess—maneuvers 
designed to deceive an opponent within the confines of each game’s respective 
rules.75 It concluded that “Ivey and Sun’s actions violated the rules of the CCA, 
a necessary, material, and mutual term of their contract with Borgata” but they 
“did not defraud Borgata in the legal sense…because their representations did 
not violate Baccarat’s rules, were not material to Borgata, and no independent 
obligation to disclose existed under the circumstances.”76 The court entered 
judgment in favor of Ivey and Sun on Borgata’s fraud-related claims and 
requested additional briefing on the issue of Borgata’s contract damages.77 
                                                            
68  Ivey II, supra note 5, at *9.  
69  Id. at **9–10.  
70  Id. at *12. 
71  See id. at **11–12.  
72  Id. at *11 (emphases added); see also infra text accompanying note 149. 
73  Ivey II, supra note 5, at *12. 
74  Id. at *10 n.19. 
75  Id. at **11–12. 
76  Id. at *12.  
77  Id.  
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D. The Court Rejects the Application of Expectation Damages. 
In its supplemental briefing, Borgata advanced two different measures of 
its contract damages.78 First, it offered restitution damages as a way to return 
the parties to their pre-wager positions.79 Borgata calculated this amount by 
accounting for all the money that Ivey deposited, withdrew, redeemed, and won 
at Baccarat.80 Borgata also included an amount that Ivey won during a craps 
session purportedly with some of his ill-gotten Baccarat winnings, but Borgata 
excluded an allegedly unrelated amount that Ivey lost at craps.81 This figure 
totaled $10,130,000.82 Borgata separately requested the return of $249,199.83 
in “comps.”83 
Borgata’s second damage calculation used expectation damages—“what 
Borgata would have won had Ivey and Sun not engaged in edge-sorting.”84 
This measure would have added an additional $5,418,311.40 to Borgata’s 
recovery by computing what Borgata should have mathematically won if the 
casino’s 1.06% banker bet and 1.24% player bet advantages were applied to the 
amount Ivey wagered during his four playing sessions.85 
The court accepted the restitutionary measure of damages and rejected the 
expectation-damage calculation as too speculative.86 The court surmised that 
“[a]lthough basic math can calculate Borgata’s potential winnings based on the 
house edge, the number of hands played, and the average bet,…the whims of 
Lady Luck” make it impossible to determine “whether defendants would have 
beaten the odds in a normal game over those four days, by luck or otherwise, 
and by what amount.”87 To the court, expectation damages unduly relied on 
hypothetical facts.88 Except for the comps, the court awarded the return of all of 
Ivey’s and Sun’s winnings, including the amount that Ivey won playing craps 
with his Baccarat winnings.89 
                                                            
78  Marina Dist. Dev. Co., LLC v. Ivey, —- F. Supp. 3d —-, 2016 WL 7246074, at 
*1 (D. N.J. Dec. 15, 2016) [hereinafter “Ivey III”]. 
79  Id. at **1–3. 
80  Id. at *3.  
81  Id.  
82  Id.  
83  Id.  
84  Id. at *1. 
85  Id. at *3 n.6. 
86  Id. at *1. 
87  Id. at *3 n.6.  
88  Id. 
89  Id. at **3-4.  
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III. CAUSES OF ACTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
A. Fraud is the Proper Common Law Claim to Recover Losses Caused by 
Cheating. 
Between the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment rulings, 
the Ivey court flip-flopped on the appropriate cause of action and the role of 
administrative remedies.90 At first, the Ivey court relegated the breach of 
contract claim to the administrative process while it proceeded with the fraud 
claim.91 As the basis for doing so, the court highlighted that the CCA—like 
most states’ gaming regimes—does not create a cause of action unknown at 
common law.92 The court acknowledged that a common law fraud claim exists 
for victims of cheating,93 but “[t]here is no statutory or common law cause of 
action for a breach of an agreement to abide by the rules of an illegal gambling 
activity.”94 Yet, at summary judgment, the court’s decision rested entirely on 
Borgata’s contractual theory of liability and rejected the fraud-based claims 
without any examination of the common law.95 The court’s change of liability 
theories did not give sufficient weight to the history and nature of the 
established common law rule that a party cheated at gambling can recover any 
losses through a cause of action for fraud, not breach of contract. 
The activity of gambling predates the common law—it “has been present 
in all cultures during all periods of time.”96 King Richard II introduced the first 
English statute prohibiting any kind of gambling game in 1388.97 The statute 
prohibited only laborers and servants of husbandry, artificers, and victuallers 
(but not “gentleman”) from playing “hand and foot ball, coits, dice, throwing of 
stone keyles, and such other importune games.”98 Subsequent statutes imposed 
various other restrictions, but in 1603, the court decision in The Case of 
                                                            
90  Setting aside, for the moment, whether the Ivey court correctly understood the 
nature of the fraudulent misrepresentation. See infra Section III(B).  
91  See generally Ivey I, supra note 30 (discussing administrative termination of 
contract based claims but allowing fraud based claims to proceed).  
92  Id. at 338; see also id. at 337 n.5; Campione v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 714 A.2d 
299, 309 (N.J. 1998) (courts will recognize a casino patron’s private right of action 
for money damages if the claim has a common law basis).  
93  Ivey I, supra note 30, at 337 n.5. 
94  Id. at 337 n.6.  
95  See generally Ivey II, supra note 5.  
96   See Anthony N. Cabot et al., Alex Rodriguez, A Monkey, and the Game of 
Scrabble: The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define the Legality of Games of Mixed 
Skill and Chance, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 384 (2009) (stating “gambling has been 
present in all cultures during all periods of time.”) (quotations omitted); see also 
Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Public Nuisance at the Crossroads: Policing the 
Intersection Between Statutory Primacy and Common Law, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 495, 
509 n.89 (2012) (“The traditional date marking the beginning of the common law is 
1066 A.D., the year of the Norman Conquest.”). 
97  United States v. Dixon, 25 F. Cas. 872, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1830). 
98  Id. (quoting 11 Hen. IV c. 4 (1409)).  
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Monopolies made it virtually impossible to outlaw all gaming.99 That decision 
held that each game was legal unless expressly prohibited by the legislature.100 
In practice, the decision allowed gaming operators to slightly modify each 
game to avoid prohibition and the legislature could not outlaw each new 
variation fast enough.101 Thus, wagering contracts were effectively valid under 
the common law.102 
Without the realistic ability to ban all gaming, the Crown restricted its 
regulatory efforts to prohibiting cheating and limiting the amount of wagers.103 
For example, the Statute of Charles II in 1661 provided that the victim of 
cheating “‘by any Fraud, Shift, Cousenage, Circumvention, Deceit, or unlawful 
Device, or ill Practice whatsoever’, might recover treble damages, one moiety 
thereof for the Crown, by suit within 6 months ‘next after such play’, or suit 
might be brought by any other person within one year after the six months 
expired.”104 The Statute of Charles II also rendered judicially unenforceable 
gaming debts in excess of one hundred Pounds.105 But parties could still 
gamble for any amount of ready money, and gaming debts remained 
enforceable up to the one hundred Pound limit.106 
In 1710, the Statute of Anne further restricted the enforceability of gaming 
debts and provided other protections against gaming fraud.107 Its 
comprehensive framework rendered void and unenforceable most (but not quite 
all) claims to recover unpaid gambling debts.108 Only gaming debts for ten 
Pounds or less remained fully enforceable in court.109 Losers of more than ten 
Pounds could sue within three months to recoup losses along with their costs of 
suit.110 “If the loser did not sue, any other person could sue for treble damages, 
one moiety for the suitor, and one moiety for the poor of the parish.”111 
                                                            
99  See Ronald J. Rychlack, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical 
Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 17 (1992). 
100  Id.  
101  Id.  
102  Id.; see also Evans v. Cook, 11 Nev. 69, 74 (1876). 
103   Rychlack, supra note 99, at 17–18 & n.31 (1992) (“Cheating has long been a 
primary reason for regulating gambling”). 
104  See LaFontaine v. Wilson, to Use of Ugast, 45 A.2d 729, 732 (Md. 1946) 
(quoting 16 Charles 2, Ch. 7 (1664) (“An Act against deceitful, disorderly and 
excessing gaming”)); see also Rychlack, supra note 99, at 17–18. 
105  Rychlack, supra note 99, at 18; LaFontaine, 45 A.2d at 732. 
106  Rychlack, supra note 99, at 18; LaFontaine, 45 A.2d at 732. 
107  See Rychlack, supra note 99, at 19; see also LaFontaine, 45 A.2d at 732. 
108  Rychlack, supra note 99, at 19–20; see also LaFontaine, 45 A.2d at 732; Burke 
v. Buck, 99 P. 1078, 1080 (Nev. 1909) (describing the Statute of Anne’s 
prohibitions as “comprehensive.”).  
109  See Rychlack, supra note 99, at 20; see also Barret v. Hampton, 4 S.C.L. 226 
(S.C. Const. App. 1807) (“Assumpsit lies to recover money won at play under £10, 
if the play be fair.”).  
110  See Rychlack, supra note 99, at 19. 
111  LaFontaine, 45 A.2d at 732. 
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Notably, Section 5 of the Statute of Anne decreed that winning more than ten 
Pounds by fraud was punishable as perjury with forfeiture of five times the 
amount won.112 Courts could also impose corporal punishment for cheating.113 
These English statutes were received and incorporated into American 
jurisprudence at the Founding.114 Many early American jurisdictions, through 
statutes or court decisions, extended the Statute of Anne’s protections by 
declaring all wagering contracts illegal and barring all enforcement of gaming 
debts.115 In one early decision, the United States Supreme Court observed the 
different English and American approaches: “In England, it is held that the 
contracts, although wagers, were not void at common law, and that the statute 
has not made them illegal, but only non-enforceable, while generally, in this 
country, all wagering contracts are held to be illegal and void as against public 
policy.”116 
Even though American courts treated gaming contracts as illegal, the 
majority of jurisdictions continued to permit parties cheated “in a crooked 
gambling game” to pursue an action for fraud.117 Judges treated wagers 
                                                            
112  Id. 
113   See Rychlack, supra note 99, at 19; W. Indies, Inc., v. First Nat. Bank of Nev., 
214 P.2d 144, 151 (Nev. 1950). 
114  See Rychlack, supra note 99, at 20 (“As the New World developed, the Statute 
of Anne, like other common law doctrines, became part of the law of every state.”); 
see also Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145, 1145–46 (Nev. 1985) (citing Sea Air 
Support, Inc. v. Herrmann, 613 P.2d 413 (Nev. 1980); Burke v. Buck, 99 P. 1078 
(Nev. 1909); Evans v. Cook, 11 Nev. 69 (1876)).  
115   See, e.g., Scott v. Courtney, 7 Nev. 419, 421 (1872) (holding that the common 
law right to recover money won at gaming “is burdened with so many restrictions, 
that at present it can hardly be said the right exists at all. In the United States, 
wagering and gaming contracts seem to have met with no countenance from the 
courts, and consequently in nearly every state they are held illegal . . . .”); see also 
Tatman v. Strader, 23 Ill. 493 (1860) (stating the Statute of Anne “9 Anne makes 
all bets upon games void.”).  
116  Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 510 (1884). 
117   See Berman v. Riverside Casino Corp., 323 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1963) 
(citing, among others, Harris v. Bowden, Queen’s Bench, 1563, Cro. Eliz. 90, 78 
Eng. Rep. 348; Dufour v. Ackland, 1830, 9 L.J.K.B. 3) (“[T]he common law rule, 
as of the time of Nevada’s admission to the Union, appears to have been that [a 
defrauded party] who lost money in a crooked gambling game could recover in a 
civil action.”); Catts v. Phalen, 43 U.S. 376, 381 (1844) (holding that lottery 
operators can recover amounts paid to individual who fixed the drawing through “a 
deeply concocted, deliberate, gross, and most wicked fraud”); Hobbs v. Boatright, 
93 S.W. 934 (Mo. 1906) (recognizing common law causes of action for fraud and 
conspiracy to recover losses stemming from fixed footrace); Stewart v. Wright, 147 
F. 321 (8th Cir. 1906) (similar); see also Zaika v. Del E. Webb Corp., 508 F. Supp. 
1005, 1008 (D. Nev. 1981) (citing Berman and recognizing a fraud action for losses 
caused by cheating); State Gaming Control Bd. v. Breen, 661 P.2d 1309, 1310 
(Nev. 1983) (distinguishing action to recover alleged keno winnings from Berman 
and Zaika but citing them with approval) but see Babcock v. Thompson, 20 Mass. 
446, 449 (1826) (“Clearly if the gaming had been fair, the law would give no 
remedy. The only question then is, whether the fraud will alter the case. We think it 
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impacted by cheating as forming no illegal contract at all118—the bets were a 
nullity or void ab initio119—and courts did not construe cheated losses as true 
unrecoverable “gaming debts.”120 For example, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina held in 1843 
that money, fairly lost at play at a forbidden game and paid, cannot be 
recovered back in an action for money had and received. But it is perfectly 
certain, that money, won by cheating at any kind of game, whether allowed or 
forbidden, and paid by the loser without a knowledge of the fraud, may be 
recovered.121 
The availability of common law fraud claims—and the distinction between 
money exchanged in a legitimate (or square) game and money lost as a result of 
cheating—persisted through the creation of modern regulatory regimes.122 The 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Erickson v. Desert Palace, Inc. is an illustration. 
There, a casino refused to pay a slot machine jackpot won by a minor.123 After 
unsuccessfully exhausting administrative remedies and seeking judicial review 
in state court, the minor’s parents filed a second action in federal court alleging 
(among other things) breach of contract, quasi-contract, fraud, and cheating.124 
The casino moved to dismiss, citing Nevada statutes that largely mirror the 
common law unenforceability of “gaming debts” and that restrict actions to 
recover certain gaming debts to an administrative review process.125 The 
                                                            
will not.”); Bradley v. Doherty, 106 Cal. Rptr. 725, 726 (Ct. App. 1973) (stating the 
general rule that California courts will not enforce illegal betting contract applies 
even if the winner wins by fraud or deceit) (citing Abbe v. Marr, 14 Cal. 210, 211 
(1859)). 
118  See Webb v. Fulchire, 25 N.C. 485, 487 (1843) (“Such a transaction cannot for 
a moment be regarded as a wager, depending on a future and uncertain event; but it 
was only a pretended wager”). 
119  Criswell v. Gaster, 5 Mart.(n.s.) 129, 131–32 (La. 1826) (“The aleatory contract 
was clearly simulated and feigned, and although intended to defraud, it could 
legally produce no effect; nothing could have been lost on it, and consequently 
nothing could be won. . ..the contract must be considered as void ab initio. . ..”).  
120  See Grim v. Cheatwood, 257 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Okla. 1953) (“Plaintiffs’ action 
is not an action to recover losses sustained in a gambling game.”); Lockman v. 
Cobb, 91 S.W. 546, 550 (Ark. 1905) (“There was no uncertain event to constitute a 
wager. It was determined and understood what the result of the pretended race 
would be before it was made. By fraud and deceit they caused him to make a 
pretended wager and robbed him of his money, pretending that he had lost it.”); see 
also Erickson v. Desert Palace, Inc., 942 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(characterizing actions to collect unpaid winnings as a “gaming debt” and 
distinguishing between actions to recover losses sustained in a “crooked” game). 
121  Webb, 25 N.C. at 486. 
122  Rose, supra note 3, at 629 (“It is important to note that these changes in the law 
on the collectability of gambling debts did not change the common law of 
Nevada. . .there is nothing in these statutes to indicate that the Nevada legislature 
meant to overturn the Statute of Anne.”). 
123  Erickson, 942 F.2d at 694–95. 
124  Id. at 694–97. 
125   See id. at 695–96 (citing NRS 463.361; NRS 463.361–NRS 463.366; NRS 
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parents tried to avoid the unenforceability bar, and the prior unfavorable 
outcome of the administrative proceeding, by invoking the common law 
exception for fraud claims.126 They argued that the casino’s refusal to pay the 
jackpot amounted to fraud and did not involve a “gaming debt” confined to 
administrative remedies.127 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It clarified that the common law “provides for 
a cause of action for fraud to recover losses sustained in a gambling 
transaction.”128 The court indicated that the enactment of the gaming statutes, 
and the creation of the administrative process, did not abrogate the common 
law rule that a party can file a civil fraud action to recover losses suffered from 
cheating.129 Instead, the statutes reflect the common law understanding that 
unpaid winnings from a legitimate game—including slot machine jackpots—
are considered “gaming debts,” and those debts are now only enforceable 
through the administrative process, if at all.130 Because the parents sued for the 
amount that the minor would have won had he been old enough to play, not an 
amount lost from cheating, their suit was actually for a “gaming debt,” and they 
were restricted to administrative remedies.131 The court summarized that 
“parties who assert they are owed a gaming debt, fraud or no fraud, are 
confined to the administrative process followed by state judicial review.”132 
A Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision interpreting New Jersey law and 
the CCA aligns with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Erickson. In Mankodi v. 
Trump, a patron sued a casino over a hand of blackjack.133 The patron bet 
$3,700 and, after he was dealt an ace, the dealer rescinded the hand.134 Gaming 
regulators later ruled that the dealer illegally withdrew the hand.135 Thereafter, 
the patron sued the casino asserting a laundry list of claims, including breach of 
contract and fraud.136 The Third Circuit, like the Ivey court’s motion to dismiss 
                                                            
463.3662- NRS 463.3668); see also Zoggolis v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 768 F.3d 
919, 921 (9th Cir. 2014) (“This part of the statute is consistent with the common-
law prohibition against enforcement of gaming debts.”).  
126  Erickson, 942 F.2d at 696. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 696.  
129  See id. at 696–97.  
130  See id. at 695–97. 
131  Id. at 696–97; see also Mattes v. Ballys Las Vegas, 227 F. App’x 567, 572 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“Mattes’ claim falls clearly within this category, because he is 
attempting to recover a gaming debt allegedly owed, which he argues he 
legitimately won or would have won.”); Devon v. Unbelievable, Inc., 29 F.3d 631 
(9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) (unpaid slot machine jackpot winnings considered a 
“gaming debt” and patron must exhaust administrative remedies).  
132  Erickson, 942 F.2d at 697. 
133   Mankodi v. Trump Marina Assocs., LLC, 525 F. App’x 161, 162 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
134  Id.  
135  Id. at 163.  
136  Id. at 163, 164–67. 
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ruling, affirmed dismissal of the patron’s breach of contract claim as a 
disguised attempt to privately enforce the CCA.137 But the court substantively 
addressed the patron’s fraud allegations and did not consider them preempted 
or covered by the CCA.138 By entertaining the fraud allegations outside the 
administrative process, the Third Circuit adhered to the common law rule that a 
victim of gaming fraud may seek recourse in court. Even the Ivey court initially 
conceded that it was unlikely that “the New Jersey legislature intended that 
casinos could be victimized by fraud and thereafter bar them, indirectly, from 
seeking redress in the courts, even if the fraud arose in the context of a 
regulated game, the rules of which are designed by state regulation.”139 
Against this background, the Ivey court’s reliance on a breach of contract 
theory appears misplaced. As the court originally acknowledged, the CCA did 
not preempt all common law claims or create a cause of action that did not 
otherwise exist.140 Under the common law, there was no contract action to 
recover cheated losses—fraud was the proper claim for victims of cheating. 
And even though the New Jersey courts take an apparently broad view of the 
issues that litigants must first present to gaming regulators,141 a properly framed 
and supported fraud claim does not need to be referred to regulators before 
filing in court.142 
B. The Fraudulent Act is Entering the Wager Without the Intent to Honor the 
Rules of Play. 
The Ivey court’s resort to a contractual theory of liability may be a 
symptom of misunderstanding the features of the gaming contract and the 
nature of a cheating patron’s fraudulent misrepresentation. Laboring under 
those misunderstandings, the court strained to distinguish the bases of 
contractual and tort liability and stretched to find a fraudulent act distinct from 
the breach of the gaming contract. Without an explanation, the Ivey court 
seemingly drew the dividing line between statutory provisions, as “primary 
                                                            
137  Id. at 166. In a footnote, the Ivey court disagreed with what it described as the 
Mankodi court’s summary dismissal of “a plaintiff’s claim against a casino because 
his claims required an interpretation of the CCA.” Ivey I, supra note 30, at 339 n.8.  
138  See Mankodi, 525 Fed. App’x at 166–67 & n.5 (noting one judge would have 
found the fraud claim preempted along with the contract claim); see also notes 
167–68 & accompanying text (describing the nature of the fraud claim at issue in 
Mankodi).  
139  Ivey I, supra note 30, at 338 n.5.  
140  Id. at 337–38 & n.5. 
141   See id. at 338–39 & n.8 (citing Campione v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 714 A.2d 
299, 308 (N.J. 1998); Golden Nugget, 2015 WL 689437). 
142  Mankodi, 525 F. App’x at 166–67; Erickson, 942 F.2d at 696; cf. Smerling v. 
Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., 912 A.2d 168, 172 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2006) (explaining 
the difference between primary and exclusive jurisdiction and surveying the types 
of common law causes of action that must first go to gaming regulators). 
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obligations,” and game rules, as secondary obligations.143 Under the court’s 
framework, the CCA is part of the gaming contract so that a breach of contract 
claim exists for a violation of its statutory provisions, but, unlike the CCA, 
Baccarat’s game rules are not part of the gaming contract so that a 
representation in conflict with the game rules can be an independent basis for a 
fraud claim.144 The court’s arbitrary exclusion of the game rules from the terms 
of the gaming contract and convoluted analysis of Borgata’s fraud claim 
overlook several fundamental elements of gaming law. 
Each wager between a casino and a patron forms a contract.145 The patron 
makes the contractual offer by placing the wager, and the casino accepts the 
patron’s offer by acknowledging the bet or simply starting the game.146 In the 
fast-paced gaming environment, contract formation generally occurs in a matter 
of seconds without any negotiation over the terms of the contract.147 As a 
result, the statutes and regulations that dictate game play supply the gaming 
contract’s specific terms.148 These statutes and regulations are the default rules 
for the games, and the Ivey court correctly determined that they also act as the 
default terms of the gaming contract.149 
                                                            
143  Ivey II, supra note 5, at *11.  
144  See id.; see also Ivey III, supra note 78, at *1 (“The Court determined that Ivey 
and Sun breached their primary obligation to not use marked cards in violation of 
the CCA, which constituted a breach of contract to abide by the CCA.”); Id. at *1 
n.2. (“The Court found in favor of Ivey and Sun on Borgata’s claim that the edge-
sorting scheme constituted fraud because Ivey and Sun did not violate the rules of 
Baccarat, and Borgata did not rely upon a material misrepresentation.”). 
145  Anthony Cabot & Robert Hannum, Advantage Play and Commercial Casinos, 
74 Miss. L.J. 681, 722 (2005). 
146  Id. at 723–24; ANTHONY N. CABOT AND KEITH C. MILLER, THE LAW OF 
GAMBLING AND REGULATED GAMING 202 n.1 (2011); see also Jordan T. Smith, 
The Iowa Supreme Court’s Flawed Application of Gaming Law Principles in 
Blackford v. Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino, 17 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 
275, 277–79 (2013) (analyzing the Iowa Supreme Court’s erroneous conclusion 
that the casino is the offeror).  
147  See Cabot & Hannum, supra note 145, at 722 (noting “[c]asino style wagering 
is essentially an adhesion contract between the casino and its patrons.”); see also 
Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1312, 1316 n.8 (D. N.J. 
1993) (stating “there is little freedom of contract in the usual sense” as “every 
aspect of the relationship between the gambler and the casino is minutely regulated 
by the state”).  
148   Cabot & Hannum, supra note 145, at 726; see also Blackford v. Prairie 
Meadows Racetrack & Casino, Inc., 778 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 2010) (stating 
statutory and regulatory restrictions are part of the parties’ gaming contract). 
149  See Ivey I, supra note 30, at 336 (“It follows then that contractual agreements, 
whether express or implied, governing casino gambling in New Jersey include a 
provision that both parties agree to abide by the CCA.”). But because statutes and 
regulations are game rules, the Ivey court’s conclusion that “none of the actual rules 
of Baccarat were broken” is inaccurate. Ivey II, supra note 5, at *9. If edge sorting 
is cheating, and violates a statute, then, by definition, Ivey broke the rules of the 
game. It also appears that the parties violated baccarat’s game rules for another 
reason. Subchapters 3 and 4 of the New Jersey Administrative Code § 69F set forth 
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However, the Ivey court failed to consider that written game rules 
displayed at the gaming area, and unwritten rules established by custom, 
tradition, and common understanding, may impose additional contractual 
terms.150 For instance, slot machine signage may set a maximum payout or 
describe the jackpot symbol alignment.151 Likewise, the statutes, regulations, or 
rules governing craps may not explicitly disclose that a patron loses if he rolls a 
seven after establishing a point number, but this rule is commonly 
understood.152 These written and unwritten game rules are also part of the 
gaming contract just like statutes and regulations.153 And it is beyond serious 
debate that “don’t cheat” is, at minimum, an unwritten rule of every game—and 
is part of every gaming contract—even if there is no statute, regulation, or 
written rule expressly prohibiting it.154 
But the incorporation of game rules and anti-cheating provisions into the 
gaming contract does not mean that a contractual theory of liability necessarily 
subsumes all actions to recover cheated losses. It is well accepted that “the 
failure to fulfill a promise to perform in the future may give rise to a fraud 
claim if the promisor ‘had no intention to perform at the time the promise was 
made.’”155 The Restatement (Second) of Torts explains that this rule “is true 
whether or not the promise is enforceable as a contract.”156 If the contract is 
void or unenforceable—like early American courts treated gaming contracts 
afflicted by cheating—the injured party’s sole remedy is an action in deceit.157 
On the other hand, if the gaming contract is enforceable—and prohibitions on 
cheating are incorporated into the contractual terms through statutes, 
regulations, or game rules—”the person misled by the representation has a 
cause of action in tort as an alternative at least, and perhaps in some instances 
                                                            
the state’s rules for Baccarat and those provisions seem inconsistent with the 
conduct of Borgata and Ivey. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 69F Subchapters 3 and 4, 
http://www.nj.gov/oag/ge/docs/Regulations/CHAPTER69F.pdf (last visited May 
15, 2017). The Ivey court did not address these regulations. 
150  See Cabot & Hannum, supra note 145, at 725. 
151   See, e.g., McKee v. Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc., 864 N.W.2d 518, 527 (Iowa 
2015) (“We agree with the district court that the Miss Kitty [slot machine] rules of 
the game are the relevant contract here and that they form an express contract.”); 
Macon Cty. Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Knowles, 39 So. 3d 100, 110 (Ala. 2009) 
(“Thus, we hold that the terms that were necessary and indispensable to the 
formation of an enforceable contract between Victoryland and Knowles were the 
rules of the wager incorporated into the help screens and pay tables of [the] 
machine”); Eash v. Imperial Palace of Miss., LLC, 4 So. 3d 1042, 1048 (Miss. 
2009) (stating that game rules posted on slot machine were the relevant contractual 
terms). 
152  Cabot & Hannum, supra note 145, at 725. 
153  Id. 
154  See id. 
155   See, e.g., Cundiff v. Dollar Loan Ctr. LLC, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1241 (D. 
Nev. 2010) (quoting Bulbman, Inc. v. Nev. Bell, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (Nev. 1992)). 
156  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. c (1977). 
157  See id.  
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in addition to his cause of action on the contract.”158 
In U.S. ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently examined in exhaustive detail common law 
fraud claims and their interaction with contract law.159 It concurred with the 
Ivey court’s assessment “that a breach of contract alone is not fraud.”160 The 
Second Circuit observed that “the common law does not permit a fraud claim 
based solely on contractual breach; at the same time, a contractual relationship 
between the parties does not wholly remove a party’s conduct from the scope 
of fraud.”161 The relevant inquiry “is when the representations were made and 
the intent of the promisor at that time.”162 “[A]t common law,” the court 
continued, “a post-agreement intent to breach the contract is not actionable as 
fraud.”163 “Failure to comply with a contractual obligation is only fraudulent 
when the promisor never intended to honor the contract.”164 The Second Circuit 
pointed out that direct proof of fraudulent intent is rare and usually comes from 
inferential or circumstantial evidence.165 “In sum,” the court concluded, “a 
contractual promise can only support a claim for fraud upon proof of fraudulent 
intent not to perform the promise at the time of contract execution. Absent such 
proof, a subsequent breach of that promise—even where willful and 
intentional—cannot in itself transform the promise into a fraud.”166 
Applying these principles to the gaming context, there exists a common 
law fraud action to recover cheated losses—even though wagers are contracts 
with express or implied anti-cheating provisions—where a patron places a bet 
without intending to abide by his obligation to play by the rules. The Third 
Circuit’s Mankodi blackjack case, discussed above, correctly applied this rule. 
That court affirmed the dismissal of the patron’s fraud claims because the 
complaint insufficiently pleaded “facts showing that the Casino intended to 
rescind the blackjack hand at the time it represented that it would play it.”167 
The court reasoned that “[a]lthough the Casino later did rescind the hand, we 
may not ‘infer fraudulent intent from mere nonperformance’ of a contract, as 
                                                            
158  Id. 
159  822 F.3d 650, 656–62 (2d Cir. 2016). 
160 Compare Ivey II, supra note 5, at *12 with O’Donnell, 822 F.3d 650, 658 (2d 
Cir. 2016); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. d (1977) (“The 
intention of the promisor not to perform an enforceable or unenforceable agreement 
cannot be established solely by proof of its nonperformance. . . .”). 
161  O’Donnell, 822 F.3d at 658.  
162  Id.  
163   Id. at 659. A claim for breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing may be appropriate when a party first decides to cheat 
during play (after the wager has been offered and accepted).  
164  Id. at 660 (quotations omitted).  
165  Id. at 659.  
166  Id. at 662.  
167   Mankodi v. Trump Marina Assocs., LLC, 525 F. App’x 161, 166-67 (3d Cir. 
2013) (emphasis added).  
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doing so would ‘eviscerate the distinction between a breach of contract and 
fraud.’”168 To state a gaming fraud claim, the plaintiff must plead facts 
demonstrating that the defendant did not intend to play by the rules when it 
offered or accepted the wager.169 
From an evidentiary standpoint, there will often be direct or circumstantial 
proof beyond the act of cheating itself that demonstrates the cheater did not 
intend, at contract formation, to perform his contractual obligation to play by 
the rules. For example, in Grim v. Cheatwood, the plaintiff lost money in a 
sham poker game and recovered in a fraud action based on evidence of pre-
game “collusion and collaboration” between the defendant and “two of his 
cohorts” to mark cards and cheat the plaintiff out of $1,000. 170 There was 
similar evidence in Hobbs v. Boatright where a jury found overwhelming proof 
of a long-running, elaborate con to entice wealthy individuals to participate in 
fixed footraces.171 Lockman v. Cobb is another case involving rigged footraces 
where the court emphasized evidence of “a previous understanding” that one of 
the runners would intentionally fall down.172 
Criminal prosecutions of cheaters provide other examples. Indeed, the Ivey 
court noted the similarities between civil and criminal fraud actions.173 In 
Sheriff of Washoe County v. Martin, authorities arrested the defendant and 
charged him with cheating in violation of Nevada’s gaming statutes.174 The 
prosecution alleged that the defendant sat at a blackjack table next to a known 
card crimper who, after tampering with the cards, signaled to the defendant 
how the defendant should play his hand.175 Both the defendant and card 
crimper varied their betting patterns when new decks of un-crimped cards 
rotated into play.176 After the preliminary hearing, the defendant filed a writ of 
habeas corpus arguing that the cheating statutes were unconstitutionally 
vague.177 
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the statutes and affirmed the 
                                                            
168  Id. at 167 (quoting United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1261 n.8 (2d 
Cir.1994)); see also Ocean Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 164 A.2d 607, 
613–14 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1960) (holding that a “false state of mind” when 
making the promise may give rise to actionable fraud provided there is evidence to 
establish fraudulent intent beyond the mere nonperformance of the contract). 
169  See Mankodi, 525 F. App’x at 167 (citing Jewish Ctr. of Sussex Cnty. v. Whale, 
432 A.2d 521, 524 (N.J. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8–2 (requiring a 
“concealment, suppression or omission” for statutory fraud liability)).  
170  257 P.2d 1049, 1049 (1953). 
171  93 S.W. 934, 934–36 (1906). 
172  91 S.W. 546, 550 (1905). 
173  Ivey II, supra note 5, at *10 n.19. 
174  662 P.2d 634, 635–36 (Nev. 1983) (citing NRS §§ 465.015, 465.083, 199.480). 
175  Id. at 636. 
176  Id.  
177  Id.  
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decision to bind over the defendant.178 The court highlighted that the legislature 
did not intend “to remove from the crime of cheating the requirement of 
fraudulent intent” and the court had “consistently drawn parallels between 
cheating and fraudulent conduct.”179 The court held that “if a player or dealer 
deceitfully alters the identifying characteristics or attributes of a game with the 
intent to deprive another of money or property by affecting the otherwise 
established probabilities of the game’s various outcomes, he or she is guilty of 
cheating within the meaning of [the statutes].”180 The court’s analysis 
distinguished card counters181 from card crimpers because crimpers illegally 
alter a characteristic of the game and eliminate the element of chance, while 
card counters merely use mental skills to take advantage of information that is 
equally available to everyone.182 As for the defendant, the court found 
sufficient evidence of fraudulent intent, even though he did not crimp the cards 
himself, based on his conversation with the card crimper while playing, the 
card crimper’s signaling, and the defendant’s suspicious betting patterns 
between crimped and un-crimped decks.183 
In Ivey’s case, if edge sorting is actually cheating,184 there was ample 
evidence of pre-contract formation fraudulent intent aside from the act of edge 
sorting. Ivey requested the five conditions so that he could successfully edge 
sort, and those requests indicate that he intended to ignore the rules of play 
before making any wager. One could also infer from Ivey’s request to play with 
Sun that there was a prior agreement between the two to cheat, as with the 
fraudsters in Grim, Hobbs, and Lockman. And, like the defendant in Martin, 
Ivey varied his betting patterns—his contractual offers—to exploit the 
advantage of edge sorting.185 The court found that Ivey bet small until the entire 
                                                            
178  Id. at 638. 
179  Id. (citing, among others, Berman v. Riverside Casino Corp., 247 F. Supp. 243, 
251 (D. Nev. 1964), aff’d, 354 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1965) (knowledge and control are 
minimum requirements for imposing civil or criminal liability under statute 
prohibiting act of allowing operation of any cheating or thieving game or device)). 
180  Id.  
181  In another case, Chen v. Nevada State Gaming Control Bd., 994 P.2d 1151, 
1151–53 (Nev. 2000), the Nevada Supreme Court determined that a card counter 
using a fake passport did not commit fraud because the casino did not detrimentally 
rely on the passport when it allowed the card counter to play. Nor was the fake 
passport the proximate cause of the casino’s damages—the patron’s skill was the 
proximate cause. Id. at 1152.  
182  Martin, 662 P.2d at 638. 
183   See id. at 636–38. The Nevada Supreme Court relied on similar evidence to 
uphold the cheating conviction in Skipper v. State, 879 P.2d 732, 732–33 (Nev. 
1994) where a dice slider changed his method of throwing the dice to conceal his 
attempts to slide, altered his betting pattern, and used a partner to block the dealer’s 
view. 
184   See Ivey II, supra note 5, at *6-7; see Schweitzer, supra note 62; see also 
Hollander, supra note 62. 
185  Ivey II, supra note 5, at *4. 
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shoe was sorted and, once the sorting was complete, he bet the maximum 
amount on every hand.186 Even without considering the act of edge sorting, 
these circumstances demonstrate that neither Ivey nor Sun placed a wager with 
the intent to play by the rules. Quite the opposite. They never intended to honor 
their promise not to cheat when entering each gaming contract. 
Properly conceptualized, it was unnecessary for the Ivey court to 
manufacture a separate basis for a fraud claim by excluding Baccarat’s game 
rules from the terms of the gaming contract. Statutory, regulatory, and rules-
based prohibitions on cheating are integral parts of the gaming contract. Still, 
victims of cheating possess a viable fraud claim to recover losses—despite the 
contractual nature of a wager—where the player places a bet without intending 
to play by the rules. 
IV. CALCULATION OF DAMAGES 
No matter the theory of liability adopted, the Ivey court erred by rejecting 
Borgata’s damage calculation using its statistical advantage or expected win 
probability. Both tort and contract law agree that parties to a gaming 
transaction can recover damages based on their statistical chance of winning 
when the odds are defined or ascertainable to a reasonable degree of certainty. 
In tort actions, like those sounding in fraud, a party may recover damages based 
on its probabilistic injury or loss of chance of winning a prize. The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts provides that an injured party can recover in “[c]ases in 
which the plaintiff is wrongfully deprived of the expectancy of winning a race 
or a contest, when he has had a substantial certainty or at least a high 
probability of success.”187 The Restatement contains two illustrations to 
illuminate the point: 
[T]he plaintiff is entered in a contest for a large cash prize to be awarded to 
the person who, during a given time limit, obtains the largest number of 
subscriptions to a magazine. At a time when the contest has one week more to 
run and the plaintiff is leading all other competitors by a margin of two to one, 
the defendant unjustifiably strikes the plaintiff out of the contest and rules him 
ineligible. In such a case there may be sufficient certainty established so that 
the plaintiff may successfully maintain an action for loss of the prospective 
benefits.188 
A is one of the three remaining contestants for a prize to be awarded in a 
newspaper popularity contest, all three remaining contestants having received 
substantially the same number of votes. For the purpose of discrediting A, B, a 
friend of one of the other contestants, causes A to be arrested, thus destroying 
A’s chance of winning the prize, $3000. Assuming that there was more than a 
mere possibility that A might have won the prize, A is entitled to damages 
                                                            
186  Id.  
187   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Nine 37A Spec. Note (1979); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. f (1979). 
188  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Nine 37A Spec. Note (1979). 
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from B based on the value of the chance that he would have received the prize, 
that is, in the absence of further evidence, $1000.189 
These examples allowed recovery because the plaintiff’s chance of 
winning was sufficiently certain. By contrast, there may be cases where the 
odds of winning are too fluid or uncertain to use probabilistic-injury theory. For 
instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that the chances of 
winning a horserace may be too speculative to permit recovery.190 But where 
the odds of a gambling game are defined, probabilistic-injury theory is an 
appropriate measure of damages. The best example comes from Judge Richard 
Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Milam v. Dominick’s Finer 
Foods, Inc.:191 
Suppose you’re playing roulette on a 37-number wheel (18 red, 18 black, and 
1 green) at the Casino de Monte-Carlo, and after you have placed your $1,000 
bet on red, which will pay you $2,000 if the ball lands on red, the casino 
collapses through the negligence of a building contractor, destroying not only 
the roulette wheel but also your chips, and you cannot get the money you paid 
for them back because all the casino’s records were destroyed when it 
collapsed. You’ve suffered a loss equal to a 48.6 percent chance of winning 
$2,000. So $972.73 would be your damages.192 
Judge Posner’s hypothetical demonstrates that the patron could rely on 
roulette’s set odds to mathematically calculate his potential damages to a 
reasonable degree of certainty.193 If the Ivey court had correctly conceived 
Borgata’s fraud claim, Borgata should have been able to recover its loss of 
chance damages based on its established house edge in Baccarat and the 
                                                            
189  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. f Illus. 16 (1979). 
190  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Nine 37A Spec. Note (1979) (“On the other 
hand, if the plaintiff has a horse entered in a race and the defendant wrongfully 
prevents him from running, there may well not be sufficient certainty to entitle the 
plaintiff to recover.”); see also Youst v. Longo, 729 P.2d 728, 737 (Cal. 1987) 
(“[T]he winner of a horserace is not always the leader throughout the race for a 
horse can ‘break the pack’ at any point in the race, even as a matter of strategy. 
Further, many races are won by a ‘nose.’ Thus, no cause of action exists for 
interference with this horseracing event.”).  
191  588 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2009). The Author has previously criticized Judge 
Posner’s roulette example because it fails to consider gaming statutes, regulations, 
and rules of play that terminate the spin (and gaming contract) as soon as a foreign 
object falls into the wheel. Jordan T. Smith, No Spin: Why Judge Posner’s Roulette 
Player Can Recover his Orange Chip, 15 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 693 (2011). 
The Author’s critique does not undermine the application of probabilistic injury 
theory to the gaming context.  
192  Milam, 588 F.3d at 958.  
193   Judge Posner’s example also demonstrates that a patron cheated by a casino 
would be wiser to rely on restitutionary damages to recover the amount wagered. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (setting forth the general 
principles of tort damages as including “compensation, indemnity or restitution for 
harms”). The odds of every gambling game favor the house so a cheated patron’s 
use of probabilistic injury theory will always result in a recovery lower than the 
amount actually bet.  
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amount that Ivey bet on each hand. The standard house advantage in Baccarat 
is 1.06% for banker bets and 1.24% for player bets.194 Applying those 
percentages to the amount Ivey bet, the court was able to calculate that Borgata 
was entitled to an additional $5,418.311.40.195 Thus, the amount of Borgata’s 
damages was mathematically certain. 
The mere presence of Lady Luck does not render probabilistic-injury 
theory too speculative. In another case using his roulette hypothetical as an 
example, Judge Posner explains that luck-based “deviation[s] would matter. . .if 
the victim of a fraud had to prove his loss with mathematical exactitude. He 
does not.”196 Statistical calculations are enough when supported by adequate 
evidence.197 And if there is any uncertainty, “doubts should be resolved against 
the wrongdoer [o]therwise the more grievous the wrong done, the less 
likelihood there would be of a recovery.”198 
The Ivey court should have adopted this type of calculation even under its 
contractual theory of liability. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides 
that 
[i]f a breach is of a promise conditioned on a fortuitous event and it is 
uncertain whether the event would have occurred had there been no breach, 
the injured party may recover damages based on the value of the conditional 
right at the time of breach.199 
Under this rule, an injured party to an aleatory200 contract “has the 
alternative remedy of damages based on the value of his conditional contract 
right at the time of breach, or what may be described as the value of his ‘chance 
of winning.’”201 Modifying the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ horseracing 
example, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts allows a bettor to recover: 
A offers a $100,000 prize to the owner whose horse wins a race at A’s track. B 
accepts by entering his horse and paying the registration fee. When the race is 
run, A wrongfully prevents B’s horse from taking part. Although B cannot 
prove that his horse would have won the race, he can prove that it was 
considered to have one chance in four of winning because one fourth of the 
money bet on the race was bet on his horse. B has a right to damages of 
$25,000 based on the value of the conditional right to the prize.202 
                                                            
194  Ivey III, supra note 78, at *3 n.6.  
195  Id.  
196  BCS Servs., Inc. v. Heartwood 88, LLC, 637 F.3d 750, 760 (7th Cir. 2011). 
197  Id.  
198  Id. at 759 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
199  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(3) (1981). 
200  “An aleatory contract is one in which at least one party is under a duty that is 
conditional on the occurrence of an event that, so far as the parties to the contract 
are aware, is dependent on chance . . . . Common examples are contracts of 
insurance and suretyship, as well as gambling contracts.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 379 cmt. a (1981). 
201  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348 cmt. d (1981). 
202  Id. at cmt. d Illus. 5.  
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Again, the presence of set or defined odds facilitates recovery. Therefore, 
even under a contractual theory of liability, the court should have permitted 
Borgata to recover the value of its chance of winning as established by its 
statistical advantage in Baccarat. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The available remedies for victims of cheating have advanced considerably 
over time. Instead of breaking kneecaps (or worse), most parties duped in a 
gambling game are now able to seek recourse in a civil action for fraud without 
being limited to administrative remedies. And while the Ivey court mistakenly 
limited Borgata to a breach of contract theory, victims of cheating can state a 
viable fraud claim if they possess evidence—aside from the act of cheating 
itself—that the cheater never intended to play by the rules when he entered the 
gaming contract. Under either theory of liability, parties cheated at gambling 
can recover damages based on their statistical chance of winning. After all, 
every gambler knows, deep down, that the odds of each game are established to 
such a degree of mathematical certainty that the house will win in the long run. 
 
